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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
X. TAX
The Summons Power of the IRS Under IRC Section 7602(b)-
A Legal Search and Seizure?
Congress granted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the authority to
investigate possible violations of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). I To
enable the IRS to exercise this authority, Congress enacted section 7602 of
the IRC which provides that the IRS may summon an individual taxpayer
to appear before the IRS, testify, and produce documents and records that
may be relevant to the IRS' investigation. 2 If a taxpayer refuses to comply
with a section 7602 administrative summons by either failing to appear before
1. I.R.C. § 7601 (\Vest Supp. 1985). Section 7601 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
provides:
The Secretary or his delegate shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause
officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time,
through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons
therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or
having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is
imposed.
Id.
In United States v. Bisceglia, the United States Supreme Court stated that the United
States government based the tax structure on a system of self-reporting. See United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975). The Court emphasized that the Government expects that
each taxpayer will disclose honestly all information relevant to his tax liability. Id. Observing
that some persons who avoid paying tax to the government are not necessarily identifiable, the
Bisceglia Court concluded that Congress gave the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) broad power
under § 7601 to investigate and audit any persons who may be liable to pay taxes. Id.
2. I.R.C. § 7602 (West Supp. 1985). Section 7602(a) of the IRC provides:
(a) AuHor= TO SUMMON, Erc.-For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or
collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business
of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person
the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary
or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce
such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under
oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.
Id.
Congress enacted § 7602(a) as part of the IRC of 1939. I.R.C. § 3614 (1939). Congress
has not changed section 7602(a) since the enactment of the IRC of 1939. See I.R.C. 7602(a)
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the IRS or refusing to produce the requested documents, the IRS can institute
an action in federal district court to enforce the summons.3 The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, however, limits the power of
the IRS to summon documents under section 7602 by requiring that the
summons meets a standard of reasonableness. 4 The fourth amendment also
prohibits the government from searching and seizing an individual's posses-
sions without first obtaining a warrant based upon a showing of probable
(West Supp. 1985). Prior to 1982, the IRS could issue a summons only for the purposes
authorized in § 7602(a). Id.; see S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1982) reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws 1030, 1030. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA) amended § 7602 to include § 7602(b) and § 7602(c). Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title III, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 622
(1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 7602(b) and 7602(c)). Section 7602(b) of the IRC provides:
(b) PURPOSE MAY INCLUfDE INQUIRY INTO OFENsE.-The purposes for which the
Secretary may take any action described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection
(a) [of: § 76021 include the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985).
Section 7602(c) of the IRC provides that the IRS may not issue a summons after the IRS
has referred the case to the Department of Justice. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985).
Section 7603 of the IRC describes the manner in which the IRS must serve a summons.
I.R.C. § 7603 (West Supp. 1985). Section 7603 requires that the Secretary of the IRS deliver a
copy of the summons to the summoned person, or leave a copy at that person's last place of
residence. Id. If the summons requests the production of books or documents, or other data,
then the summons must describe the requested material with reasonable certainty. Id.
Section 7605 of the IRC describes the time and place of the examination of the summoned
person. I.R.C. § 7605 (West 1954 & West Supp. 1985). Section 7605 requires that the time and
place for the examination be reasonable and that the examination never be less than 10 days
from the date of the summons. Id.
3. I.R.C. § 7604 (West 1954 & West Supp. 1985). When a person refuses to comply with
an IRS summons, the IRS will examine the summoned person's situation and the investigative
position of the IRS before applying to federal court for judicial enforcement of the summons.
See H.G. BA.TER, TAX FRAUD AND EvASION § 5.01[l](b) (5th ed. 1983). If the IRS decides that
that person's records or testimony are of significant interest to the IRS investigation, then the
IRS will begin enforcement proceedings against the summoned party in federal district court.
Id. Section 7604(a) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce an IRS summons.
I.R.C. § 7604(a) (West 1954). Section 7604(a) grants the district court the power to enforce a
challenged summons after judicial review. Id. Section 7604(b) authorizes a court to punish for
contempt any person who fails to comply with a judicially enforced summons. I.R.C. § 7604(b)
(West Supp. 1985).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment guarantees in part, that "the
people [shall] be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. The fourth amendment applies to a criminal case when the
Government conducts a search and a seizure, and the Government attempts to use the seized
evidence to prosecute. See generally THE CONsrrrTUnON oF THE UNITED STATES 1045 (L. Jayson
ed. 1973) (discussion of interpretation of fourth amendment). The fourth amendment protects
an individual's privacy interests-not property. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973) (fourth amendment limits
IRS to reasonable searches and seizures and prohibits unrestricted rummaging of person's
private possessions).
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cause5 and issued by a neutral magistrate. 6 The United States Supreme Court
has determined, nevertheless, that the IRS need not show probable cause
before a neutral magistrate to gain enforcement of a summons that is
reasonable in scope.
7
Prior to 1982, the IRS could summon documents pursuant to IRC
section 7602 only for civil investigations8 or joint civil-criminal investiga-
tions.9 Through the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Framer's inclusion in the fourth amendment of a
search warrant requirement was a reaction to the general warrant and warrantless searches that
the colonists suffered. See generally Tan CoNsrruTnoN OF Ta UNITED STATES 1043 (L. Jayson
ed. 1973) (discussing reason behind fourth amendment warrant requirement). The fourth
amendment warrant requirement mandates that the police obtain, whenever practical, judicial
approval of a search and seizure through the warrant process prior to the search and seizure.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) (search or seizure of a suspect's
property without warrant is per se unreasonable). The Framers intended the probable cause
requirement to justify the invasion of a person's privacy by limiting the search through issuance
of a warrant to that which is reasonable and relevant to the particular search. See id. at 473-
484. Probable cause to search exists only when the police officers have a reasonable belief that
a person has violated the law, that property related to the violations exists, that the police
officer found the property in a certain place, and that the police officer can describe the
property with particularity. See Lowrey v. United States, 161 F.2d 30, 33 (8th Cir.) (probable
cause for issuance of search warrant implies specific violation with respect to specific property,
premises, or persons, each of which police can identify unmistakably), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
849 (1947). The particularity requirement defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure,
protecting the individual and preventing general searches and seizures. United States v. Wrob-
lewski, 105 F.2d 444, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1939). Federal courts do not require a formal judicial
warrant in all administrative searches. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967) (fourth amendment warrant exception applies to certain administrative searches). In
warrantless administrative searches, courts must balance the necessity of the warrantless search
against the rationale behind the warrant requirement. See id. (discussing whether burden of
obtaining warrant is likely to frustrate governmental purpose behind search).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment neutral magistrate requirement
demands that a detached and neutral magistrate determine whether the evidence that the police
officers presented is sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant. See Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). A neutral magistrate stands between zealous police officers
in pursuit of evidence and the privacy rights of citizens. See id.
7. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). In Powell, the Supreme Court
held that the IRS does not need to meet the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause
to obtain enforcement of § 7602 summons because enforcement of the probable cause standard
would jeopardize the liberal investigative powers of the IRS. Id.; see supra notes 4-6 and
accompanying text (discussing fourth amendment warrant requirement); infra notes 70-76 and
accompanying text (discussion of United States v. Powell Court's standards for enforcement of
IRS summons).
8. See I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 2 (discussing authority of IRS
to summons documents pursuant to § 7602(a)); infra note 15 (revenue agents may issue summons
pursuant to § 7602(a) only for purpose of determining whether taxpayer is civilly liable).
9. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1971) (IRS special agent of
Criminal Division may conduct investigation jointly with revenue agent of Audit Division); see
infra note 15 (IRS conducts joint investigation for both civil and criminal infractions).
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Act of 1982 (TEFRA),O Congress added section 7602(b)" to the IRC, which
expanded the purposes for which the IRS may issue a summons to include
solely criminal investigations.' 2 In United States v. Morgan,3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the IRS
could search and seize the documents of a taxpayer suspected of a criminal
violation pursuant to amended section 7602(b) of the IRC without violating
the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
1 4
In Morgan, IRS revenue agent Leniel Brite of the Examination Division, 5
approached the defendant-taxpayer, Olen Morgan, president and sole stock-
10. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title
III, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 622 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 7602(b) and 7602(c)); see infra notes 103-
10 and accompanying text (discussion of legislative history of TEFRA § 333(a)).
11. I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 2 (text of § 7602(b)).
12. I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (§
7602(b) authorizes issuance of summons for solely criminal investigations).
13. 761 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 1012; see supra note 2 (text of IRC § 7602(b)).
15. See M.I. SALTZ mAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.02 (1981). The IRS is divided
into various divisions represented in both a National Office and field offices or district offices.
Id. at 1.02[2]. TnE COMPLIANCE DIVISION OVERSEES THE OPERATIONS AND COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES
oF rim IRS. Id. The IRS divided the Compliance Division into five subdivisions. Id. at
1.0212][a]. The Correction Division assesses and collects delinquent taxes. Id. The Examination
Division examines filed income tax returns. Id. The Criminal Investigation Division investigates
possible criminal violations of the tax laws. Id. The Appeals Division supervises taxpayers'
appeals of district determinations. Id. The Office of International Operations administers and
enforces the internal revenue laws pertaining to certain United States citizens living abroad and
nonresident aliens or corporations with income derived from the United States. Id.
The Collection Division, Examination Division, and Criminal Investigation Division
supervise and direct the taxpayer compliance functions at the district level of the IRS. Id. At
the district level, the IRS chooses some tax returns for field examination, or audit. Id. IRS
revenue agents conduct both the examination of tax returns chosen for audit and the collection
of delinquent taxes. Id. The IRS may hold a taxpayer civilly liable if he fails to comply with
the internal revenue laws. Id. at 8.06; see generally I.R.C. CHAPTER 68 (§§ 6651-6699) (West
1954 & West Supp. 1985).
The IRS requires a revenue agent who uncovers indications of tax fraud during a civil
investigation to suspend the examination and refer the case to the Criminal Investigation
Division. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4565.21 MT 4500-324 (Oct. 16, 1980) (CCH). If the case
warrants further examination, the Criminal Investigation Division assigns the case to a special
agent. Id. A special agent can make an independent investigation of criminal liability or a joint
investigation of civil-criminal liability with a revenue agent from either the Examination Division
or Correction Division. Id. at 9781, HAND3ooK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, § 3(10) 5, MT 9781-1
(Jan. 18, 1980); id. at 9311.2, MT 9-151 (April 3, 1980). A special agent in a criminal
investigation attempts to discover evidence to develop a potential criminal case. Id. at 9781,
HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, § 3(10)7, MT 978-1 (Jan. 18, 1980). In any joint investigation,
the criminal aspect of the case prevails over the civil aspect of the case. Id.
Both revenue agents and special agents have the authority to issue a summons. I.R.C. §
7602(a) (West Supp. 1985). A revenue agent may not issue a summons to further investigate a
case if the revenue agent suspects that the taxpayer has committed fraud. INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL 4565.21, MT 4500-324 (Oct. 16, 1980). Special agents of the Criminal Investigation
Division are the only revenue officials whom the IRS allows to issue a summons to investigate
possible criminal conduct. See SArzmAN, supra at 13.0112] (ADnn4IsTRArW PRACTICE).
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holder of Pool Builders' Supply of the Carolinas, Inc. (PBS), to audit the
records of PBS for the tax years 1979 and 1980.16 Morgan cooperated with
agent Brite and allowed Brite to examine the requested PBS records."7 Upon
finding a large discrepancy between the income reported on PBS' 1979 and
1980 tax returns and the deposits in the corporation's bank account, agent
Brite asked Morgan for an explanation, but was dissatisfied with Morgan's
answer.'8 Agent Brite then referred the matter to the Criminal Investigation
Division of the IRS to investigate the possibility of criminal tax fraud. 9
Special Agent Howell of the Criminal Investigation Division issued Morgan
an administrative summons pursuant to IRC section 7602, which required
Morgan to produce certain PBS financial records and to give testimony
pertaining to the investigation.2" Morgan appeared before Special Agent
Howell as the summons required, but refused to provide testimony or to
produce the requested records. 2' The IRS then petitioned the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to enforce the
16. 761 F.2d at 1010. Tax returns selected for field examination have been computer
classified as having audit potential and the IRS has chosen the returns for examination because
the returns have a greater chance of containing errors. SALTzmAN, supra note 15, at 8.06. THE
REVENUE AGENT EXAMINES THE TAXPAYER'S BOOKS AND RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHETHER, TO THE
REVENUE AGENTS SATISFACTION, THE TAXPAYER HAS PAID THE CORRECT TAXABLE INCOME AND
WHETHER THE TAXPAYER OWES ANY TAX. Id.
In Morgan, Agent Brite examined records of PBS for civil tax assessment purposes. Brief
for Appellants at 3, United States v. Morgan, 761 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1985). Agent Brite did
not issue a summons. 761 F.2d at 1010.
17. United States v. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. 1463, 1465 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
18. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1010. In Morgan, Agent Brite attempted to account for the large
discrepancy between the amount of income reported on PBS' tax returns and the amount that
PBS maintained in the bank by examining the records of PBS. Id. Agent Brite also asked
Morgan and Morgan's attorney to explain the differences. Id. Agent Brite was unable to
determine, to his satisfaction, the amount of discrepancy and the reason for the discrepancy.
Id.; Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 2-3.
19. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1010. The IRS instructs a revenue agent conducting an investi-
gation of civil tax liability to be alert for any signs of possible tax fraud and to suspend the
civil investigation and refer the case to the Criminal Investigation Division when the agent
suspects fraud. INTERNAL REVENUIE MANUAL 4565.21, MT 4500-324 (Oct. 16, 1980); see supra
note 15 (indications of tax fraud require referral to Criminal Investigation Division for criminal
investigation).
In Morgan, the Criminal Investigation Division assigned the Morgan case as a joint civil-
criminal investigation to Special Agents Benjamin Howell and Robert Greene. 761 F.2d at 1010.
Special Agents Howell and Greene indicated to Morgan's attorney that they were investigating
possible criminal tax violations committed by Morgan. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1465.
20. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1010; I.R.C. § 7602 (West Supp. 1985). In Morgan, Special
Agent Howell expanded the investigation of Morgan to include the tax year 1978. Id. The
summons that Special Agent Howell issued called for production of documents including
banking statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets, check stubs and savings account records
for PBS, and books and records maintained by PBS in the general course of business including
cash receipt journal, ledgers, invoices, sales records, expense records, and loan documents.
Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1465.
21. 761 F.2d at 1010.
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summons pursuant to IRC section 7604.22
Defendant Morgan objected to enforcement of the summons on both
procedural and constitutional grounds. 23 Morgan argued that the IRS had
not followed correct procedure since the IRS had not sent Morgan a second
inspection notice as IRC section 7605(b) required.14 Morgan also asserted
that the scope of the summons that Special Agent Howell issued was too
broad.25 Defendant Morgan further alleged that the summons jeopardized
unconstitutionally both his fourth amendment protection against an unrea-
sonable search and seizure and his fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination. 26 Morgan argued that enforcement of the summons would
22. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1465; see I.R.C. § 7604(a) (West 1954) (granting federal
district courts jurisdiction to enforce IRS summons).
23. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1465; see infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussion
of defendant Morgan's procedural argument); infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of defendant Morgan's constitutional argument).
24. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469. Section 7605(b) of the IRC states that the IRS cannot
make more than one inspection of a taxpayer's records for each taxable year unless the IRS
gives written notice to the taxpayer that an additional inspection is necessary. I.R.C. § 7605(b)
(West 1954). In Morgan, defendant Morgan argued that the summons was not enforceable
because Special Agent Howell's investigation constituted a second inspection of the same records
that Revenue Agent Brite had inspected and that § 7605(b), therefore, required that Special
Agent Howell issue a written notice of the second inspection. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469.
Revenue Agent Brite testified that he had not completed the civil investigation of PBS' records
when Brite referred the case to Special Agent Howell. Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at
3. The district court ruled that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to establish whether Revenue
Agent Brite had completed his investigation and whether Special Agent Howell therefore had
to issue a written notice to Morgan under § 7605(b) prior to the second investigation. Morgan,
579 F. Supp. at 1469. The IRS appealed the decision. 761 F.2d at 1009. The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision. 761 F.2d at 1010-11. The Fourth Circuit held as a matter
of law that Special Agent Howell did not have to issue a written notice of a second inspection
to Morgan under § 7605(b) since Revenue Agent Brite had suspended, although not completed,
his civil investigation while Special Agent Howell conducted a criminal investigation. Id.
25. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469. In Morgan, the summons that Special Agent Howell
issued to Morgan contained the phrase "including [documents], but not limited to ... ." Id.;
see supra note 20 (Special Agent Howell issued summons that requested production of documents
and records of PBS). The district court held that the summons was too broad and ordered
Morgan to produce only the documents actually listed in the summons. 761 F.2d at 1010.
Neither defendant Morgan nor the IRS appealed this decision. Id.
26. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1467. In Morgan, Morgan argued that enforcement of the
summons would violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Morgan
asserted that since Special Agent Howell's investigation carried possible criminal liability, the
fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination prohibited production of the records and
his testifying. Id. The district court recognized that Morgan, as custodian of PBS's records,
could invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when asked to give oral
testimony, but that Morgan could not withhold production of PBS's records on the ground
that the record contents might incriminate Morgan as custodian. Id. Morgan also argued, and
the district court rejected, that Morgan, as president of PBS, could claim the fifth amendment
privilege on behalf of PBS. Id. at 1468. On appeal, Morgan contended that § 7602(b) violates
the fifth amendment guarantee of prosecution only upon the indictment as found by a grand
jury. 761 F.2d at 1012. Morgan argued that § 7602(b) grants special agents overly broad powers
that jeopardize the role of the grand jury as the main conduit for criminal discovery. Id. The
Morgan court rejected defendant Morgan's fifth amendment powers of the IRS under § 7602(b).
Id.
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violate his rights under the fourth amendment because the IRS had not
obtained a warrant based upon probable cause before seizing the PBS
records. 27 Morgan also alleged that IRC section 7602(b) is unconstitutional
on its face under the fourth amendment. 28 Morgan contended that IRC
section 7602(b) allows an IRS special agent, through issuance of an IRC
section 7602(b) summons, to compel a person or corporation to produce
private records and documents for the sole purpose of investigating a possible
criminal violation without first securing a warrant based on probable cause. 29
In response to Morgan's argument that the IRS had to issue a second
inspection notice under IRC section 7605(b), the district court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether agent Brite had finished his audit,
in which case Special Agent Howell would have had to issue a second
inspection notice prior to summoning PBS' documents. 30 Also finding that
the summons was too broad, the district court modified the summons.3 The
district court then rejected defendant Morgan's constitutional argument and
enforced the section 7602 summons.3 2
The district court in Morgan found that the summons did not affect
either defendant Morgan's fourth amendment interests or those of his
corporation, PBS.3 The district court reasoned that neither Morgan nor PBS
had a legitimate interest, of which the fourth amendment afforded protection,
because the documents that the IRS summoned did not fall within a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.3 4 The district court noted that the
summoned documents were the business records of PBS.35 The district court
rationalized, therefore, that the records sought were not the constitutionally
protected "private papers" of either Morgan or PBS. 36 The district court
27. Id. at 1466. In Morgan, defendant Morgan argued that the IRS' investigation of PBS
was solely a criminal tax investigation. Id. Defendant Morgan further asserted that the IRS
should obtain a warrant based on probable cause before seizing information. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1468-1469. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (text of § 7602(b) as
amended in 1982); supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussion of fourth amendment
guarantees and requirements); infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (legislative history of
IRC § 7602(b)).
30. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1467; see supra note 24 (district court in Morgan scheduled
evidentiary hearing to decide Morgan's procedural argument).
31. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469; see supra note 25 (district court in Morgan modified
summons).
32. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1467, 1469; see infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text
(discussion of Morgan district court's reasoning).
33. Morgan, 579 F. Supp at 1466.
34. Id. at 1466-67. The district court in Morgan held that the business records of PBS
were not private papers and therefore the fourth amendment did not protect the records. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The district court in Morgan noted that the summons issued to Morgan, as
president of PBS, sought only the business records of PBS. Id. The district court stated that
these records were not the private records of either Morgan or PBS. Id. The district court
recognized that the fourth amendment protected a person's "zone of privacy" from govern-
mental investigative activities. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) which
held that bank checks voluntarily displayed to banks are not confidential communications of
1986]
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also ruled that IRC section 7602(b) was constitutional.17 The district court
noted that before the 1982 amendment to section 7602, the IRS could issue
a summons only for the congressionally authorized purposes listed in section
7602(a).38 The district court stated that the 1982 TEFRA amendment to
section 7602(b) permitted the IRS to issue a summons for a legitimate inquiry
into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the
internal revenue laws. 39 The district court noted that the Supreme Court
already had approved implicitly the use of a section 7602 summons for a
purely criminal investigation 4" and that the legislative history of section
7602(b) clearly indicated that Congress authorized the use of a summons for
purely criminal investigations. 4' Defendant Morgan appealed the district
court's disposition of his constitutional argument to the Fourth Circuit.
4 2
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit in Morgan
first addressed the power of the IRS to summon and examine documents
under section 7602(a) of the IRC.43 The Morgan court noted that prior to
the 1982 TEFRA amendment to the IRC, the IRS could summon documents
only for the purposes of ascertaining the correctness of a tax return,
determining the tax liability of a person, and collecting any tax deficiency. 44
The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that TEFRA expanded the purposes for
which the IRS can use the summons power to include solely criminal
investigations. 45 The Morgan court, noting that TEFRA also limited the IRS'
summons power, recognized that pursuant to the TEFRA limitation, the IRS
may not issue a summons if the IRS has referred the investigation to the
United States Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.
4 6
depositor); see Donovan v. Mehlenbacher, 652 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1981) (payroll records
kept pursuant to federal regulations have public aspect and fourth amendment will not protect).
37. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1468-69; see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text
(discussion of district court's rationale in holding § 7602(b) constitutional).
38. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1468-69; see I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1985); supra note
2 (I.R.C. § 7602(a) lists purposes for which IRS may issue summons).
39. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1468; see I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 2
(I.R.C. § 7602(b) expanded purposes for which IRS may issue summons to include criminal
investigations).
40. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469 (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S.
298, 318 (1978); see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (discussion of LaSalle).
41. Morgan, 579 F. Supp. at 1469; see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text
(discussion of legislative history of IRS § 7602(b)).
42. Morgan, 761 F.2d 1009 (1985). The IRS appealed the district court's ruling that the
IRS must provide a second inspection notice. Id. at 1011-I1. The Fourth Circuit held that the
IRS did not have to issue a second notice. Id. at 1011.
43. Id. at 1011.
44. Id. at 1012; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (text of § 7602(a)).
45. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 2 (text
of § 7602 as amended by TEFRA); infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of IRS § 7602(b)).
46. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 2 (text
of § 7602 as amended by TEFRA); infra note 108 and accompanying text (limitations imposed
on § 7602(b)).
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The Fourth Circuit next addressed defendant Morgan's argument that
IRC section 7602(b) violated the fourth amendment because section 7602(b)
authorizes an IRS agent in a criminal investigation, without first having
secured a warrant issued from a neutral magistrate and based upon probable
cause, to issue a summons compelling a person to disclose his private records
and documents. 47 The Morgan court stated that an IRS summons alone was
not a search and seizure because an IRS summons is not self-enforcing.
48
The Morgan court noted that although a summons issued pursuant to section
7602 commands that a person appear before the IRS and produce records
or give testimony, 49 an IRS agent cannot force a person to disclose the
summoned records. 50 The Morgan court asserted that the only action that
an IRS agent may take when a person refuses to comply with a summons is
to petition a district court and request judicial enforcement of the summons .5
The Fourth Circuit noted that a court will not enforce a section 7602
summons if enforcement would abuse the judicial process by forcing a person
to produce the summoned documents before the IRS has established that it
had issued the summons in good faith.52 The Morgan court reasoned,
47. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012. In Morgan, defendant Morgan argued that § 7602(b) of
the IRC violates the fourth amendment proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
of private papers and records. Id.; Brief for Appellee at 25, United States v. Morgan, 761 F.2d
1009 (4th Cir. 1985). Defendant Morgan argued as if the IRS was investigating Morgan himself,
not PBS, in a solely criminal investigation. See Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012. The Fourth Circuit
addressed the case as if the IRS was investigating Morgan personally. See id. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit did not base the Morgan decision on a distinction between Morgan's private
papers and PBS' business records. See id.
48. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012. The Morgan court stated that defendant Morgan misin-
terpreted the character of an IRS summons. Id. The Morgan court noted that an IRS summons
does not authorize a search or a seizure. Id.
49. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 2 and accompanying text
(summons issued pursuant to § 7602 of IRC commands production of any relevant books,
papers, records or data, and testimony by any person having information relevant to IRS
inquiry).
50. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012.
51. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7604(b) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 3 and accompanying text (§
7604(b) of IRC authorizes IRS to apply to district court for enforcement of summons). The
Fourth Circuit, citing United States v. Lask, noted that a district court can compel a taxpayer
to comply with a summons. 761 F.2d at 1012; see Lask, 703 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983) (IRS has no power to enforce summons but through district court
enforcement).
52. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012. The Fourth Circuit in Morgan cited United States v.
Powell to support its conclusion that a court will not enforce a summons if the IRS has not
met the burden of showing that the IRS met certain good faith standards enunciated in Powell.
761 F.2d at 1012; see Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text
(discussion of judicial standard of review enunciated in Powell).
The Morgan court also cited United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, in which the Supreme
Court summarized the requirements necessary for judicial enforcement of an IRS summons.
761 F.2d at 1012; see LaSalle, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978). The LaSalle court stated that to prevent
the IRS from abusing the judicial process, a district court cannot enforce a summons before
finding that the IRS issued the summons in good faith. 437 U.S. at 313-14 (citing Powell); see
infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (discussion of LaSalle).
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therefore, that judicial enforcement proceedings would prevent a section
7602(b) administrative summons from endangering any constitutional guar-
antees.1
3
The Fourth Circuit in Morgan ruled that an IRS summons issued during
the investigation of possible criminal violations does not violate the fourth
amendment guarantee of a search warrant. 54 The Morgan court's analysis is
a correct application of the current standard applied to administrative
summonses issued during the investigation of possible civil violations.5 The
Morgan court reasoned that when the IRS institutes a summons enforcement
proceeding to investigate a taxpayer suspected of criminal fraud, the district
court will protect the taxpayer's fourth amendment rights by ascertaining
whether the summons is reasonable.5 6 The Fourth Circuit based its decision
on a series of Supreme Court cases that not only limited the IRS' broad
authority to issue a summons, but also developed the standard of review
that courts should follow in enforcing a summons. 57 Although the Supreme
Court decided these cases, which are relevant to the enforcement of admin-
istrative summons issued for civil tax purposes, 5 prior to the amendment of
section 7602(b) of the IRC,59 the Fourth Circuit in Morgan applied the civil
summons standard of review to a criminal summons case.6
0
The Supreme Court, in Reisman v. Caplin,6' considered the rights of a
person summoned pursuant to a civil investigation under section 7602(a) of
the IRC.62 In Reisman, the Suprerfie Court set forth a procedure for
53. See Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see also infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text
(Morgan district court's standard of review of IRC § 7602(b) summons is not sufficient to
protect constitutional rights of taxpayer).
54. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Morgan).
55. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (standard of review for administrative
summonses issued for investigation of civil violations of tax laws); supra notes 47-53 and
accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's analysis of enforcement of summons in Morgan).
56. See Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; supra notes 52-53 (discussion of Fourth Circuit's view
that judicial review curtails constitutional violations).
57, Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see supra note 52 (cases relied on by Fourth Circuit in
Morgan); infra notes 61-96 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court cases estab-
lishing standard of review for enforcement of summons).
58. See infra notes 61-96 and accompanying text (analysis of development of case laws
pertaining to enforcement of administrative summons issued for civil tax purposes).
59. See Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985).
60. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012.
61. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
62. Id. at 445-50; see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussion of Reisman).
Prior to the decision in Reisman v. Caplin, the Supreme Court had decided that the courts in
the information gathering activities of administrative agencies could determine only whether the
IRS issued the agency's summons for a lawful purpose. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1964). In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, the Supreme
Court upheld an investigative summons which the Fair Labor Administration had issued under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Id. at 218. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)
(text of Fair Labor Standards Act). The defendant publishing company argued that the
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challenging a summons issued pursuant to an administrative investigation.
63
The Reisman Court held that although section 7601 authorizes the IRS to
examine books and papers through issuance of a summons pursuant to
section 7602, the summons, if challenged by the party summoned, is not
enforceable without a judicial determination of the challenge. 64 Under the
administrative procedure that Reisman established, both the party summoned
and the party that the summons affects may appear before the court and
challenge the summons. 6
In United States v. Powell,66 decided the same year as Reisman, the
Supreme Court proposed that the investigative power of the IRS was
Administrator of the Fair Labor Administration had no reason to suppose that the defendant
company had violated the statute. Id. at 189. Therefore, the defendant asserted that the
Administrator was "fishing" for evidence. Id. at 191. The Court held that Congress had
mandated statutorily the purpose for which the Administrator conducted the investigation. Id.
at 208. The Oklahoma Press Court stated that the FLSA authorized the Administration to
inquire into possible FLSA violations. Id. at 208. The Supreme Court noted that the investigative
power of the Administration included the power to inquire into any possible violations of the
Act. Id. at 201. The Oklahoma Press Court further determined that the purpose behind the
congressionally authorized investigation was not only to investigate a charge or complaint but
also to discover evidence to make a charge or complaint when justified. Id. Finally, the Supreme
Court held that the Administration did not need to prove that "probable cause" existed for
believing that the company had violated the act. Id. at 201. See supra note 5 (probable cause
requirement). Although the Oklahoma Press Court found that the Administration had broad
investigative powers, the Court limited that power by imposing a minimum standard of
reasonableness and relevancy. 327 U.S. at 201, 208. The Supreme Court ruled that an enforcing
court will determine only whether the statute authorizes the Administration's investigation. Id.
63. 375 U.S. at 445-49.
64. Id. at 446. The Reisman Court set forth several procedural rules that the IRS must
follow when the party summoned challenges a summons. Id. at 445-449. The Reisman Court
held that if the IRS wishes to enforce a summons, the IRS must petition the federal district
court pursuant to § 7602(b). Id. Section 7402(b) of the IRC grants federal district courts
jurisdiction to compel compliance with summonses. I.R.C. § 7402(b) (West Supp. 1985).
65. 375 U.S. at 445.
66. 379 U.S. at 48 (1964). In United States v. Powell, the IRS summoned respondent
Powell to appear and produce records relating to the tax returns that Powell's laundromat had
filed. Id. at 49. Powell appeared before the IRS, but refused to refuse the records, contending
that before the IRS could force him to produce the records, the IRS had to show some grounds
for believing that Powell had committed a fraud. 1d. Petitioner Powell also argued that §
7605(b) of the IRC prevented the IRS from examining the taxpayer's records because the IRS
already had examined the records, and because the three years statute of limitations had run
for assessment of deficiencies. Id. at 49-50; see I.R.C. § 7605(b) (West 1954). Section 7605(b)
of the IRC provides that the IRS may not examine a taxpayer's documents twice in one year
unless the IRS "notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection inspection is
necessary." I.R.C. § 7605(b) (West Supp. 1983). The IRS then petitioned the district court for
enforcement of the summons, stating that the special agent investigating the case had reason to
believe that the taxpayer fraudulently had falsified the laundromat's tax returns. 379 U.S. at
49. The district court in Powell ruled for the IRS. Id. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding
that the IRS petition must satisfy a test of probable cause. Id.; see supra note 5 (discussion of
standard of probable cause). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine what standards
the IRS must meet to obtain judicial enforcement of a summons. 379 U.S. at 49; see infra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Powell Court standards).
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analogous to the power of a grand jury. 67 Relying on United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 68 the Powell Court stated that the IRS, like a grand jury, can issue
orders for the discovery of possible.violations of the IRC even if the IRS
only suspects that a taxpayer violated the law or if the IRS wants assurance
that the taxpayer is not violating the law.69 The Powell Court held that the
fourth amendment required the IRS to make a showing of probable cause
to gain judicial enforcement of a summons.70 The Powell Court stated that
if courts were to enforce the probable cause standard to IRS summonses,
the courts would jeopardize the investigative powers of the IRS. 71 The Powell
court set forth, however, four requirements that the IRS must adhere to in
good faith before a court will enforce a summons. 72 First, the IRS must
conduct the investigation pursuant to a legitimate administrative purpose
authorized in section 7602(a).73 Second, the IRS must show that the inquiry
is relevant to that legitimate purpose.7 4 Third, the information sought must
67. See infra text accompanying note 69 (administrative investigation similar to grand
jury investigation).
68. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
69. 379 U.S. at 57; see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S., 632, 642-43 (1956)
(FTC has broad investigative powers).
70. 379 U.S. at 57. The Powell Court stated that courts should read the term "necessary"
in section 7605(b) of the IRC in light of the authority of the IRS to investigate under § 7602
of the IRC. Id. at 56; see supra note 66 (text of § 7605(b)); supra note 2 (test of § 7602). The
Powell Court held that the term "necessary" in § 7605(b) does not mean that the IRS has to
meet a probable cause standard to obtain enforcement of a summons. 379 U.S. at 57; see supra
note 5 (probable cause standard). The Powell Court reasoned that the IRS need not meet any
standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of a § 7602 summons because courts do not
require other agencies with similar investigative powers such as the Federal Trade Commission
to meet a probable cause standard prior to investigation of a possible violation. 379 U.S. at 57.
71. Id. at 56-57. The Powell Court examined the legislative history of section 7605(b) of
the IRC and determined that Congress did not intend the courts to oversee the IRS' determi-
nations to investigate possible violations. Id. at 56.
72. Id. at 57-58; see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (four requirements necessary
for enforcement of summons under Powell).
73. 379 U.S. at 57. The Powell Court stated that a court will not enforce a summons if
the IRS served the summons to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution or for any
other improper purpose that brings into question the good faith of the IRS in issuing the
summons. Id. The Powell Court stated that the only legitimate purposes for issuing a summons
were those persons listed in IRC §7602(a). Id.; see supra note 2 (text of § 7602(a)).
74. 379 U.S. at 57. The statutory language of § 7602(a)(2) authorizes the IRS to summon
persons to produce documents "as may be relevant or material" to the inquiry of the correctness
of the tax return. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983). The test for relevance of the summoned
information is whether the documents sought in the IRS' investigation might shed light upon
whether a return is correct. See United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973)
(relevancy in particular circumstances should indicate "realistic expectation rather than idle
hope" that the police will discover something); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 515
(3rd Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523-524 (2d Cir. 1968)
(same). Because the IRS cannot be certain that requested documents are relevant to an
investigation until reviewed, the IRS need not meet a high threshold of relevancy in order to
examine the documents requested. See United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978)
(IRS must show that information sought might throw light upon correctness of taxpayer's
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
not be already in the possession of the IRS. 75 And finally, the IRS must
follow the administrative steps set forth in the IRC.7 6 The Powell Court
reaffirmed the Reisman holding in concluding that only a court may enforce
a challenged summons and that a court will not enforce a summons if
enforcement would be an abuse of the judicial process.
77
The Supreme Court, in Donaldson v. United States7 1 elaborated on the
legitimate purpose standard enunciated in Powell.79 In Donaldson, the Su-
preme Court questioned whether the IRS has issued a summons for an
improper purpose and in bad faith when the civil tax liability investigation
might result in criminal tax fraud prosecution. 0 Defendant Donaldson argued
return), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Sup. 322, 329 (D. Mass. 1979) (same); In re Co-Build Cos., Inc. v. Rubin, 77-2 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9735 (E.D. PA. 1977) (s~mE).
75. 379 U.S. at 58. Powell requires that the IRS show either that the IRS does not possess
the information sought in the summons, or that the IRS cannot obtain the information
practicably. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973).
76. 379 U.S. at 58. Under the final Powell requirement, the IRS must follow the
administrative steps set out in the IRC relating to service of summons, the time and place of
the examination, the description of records that the IRS wants produced, unnecessary and
second inspections or examinations, and notice of when to serve a third-party recordkeeper. Id.
at 255; see I.R.C. § 7603-7609 (West 1954 & West Supp. 1985) (required administrative steps
for enforcement of § 7602 summons).
77. 379 U.S. at 58; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussion of Reisman
Court's analysis of abuse of Court's process); infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text (abuse
of court's process). The Supreme Court in Powell stated that, because enforcement of an
administrative summons invokes the judicial process, the court may not permit the IRS to abuse
the court's process. Id. The Powell Court noted that an abuse of the court's process might
occur if the IRS issued the summons for an improper purpose. Id. The Supreme Court
determined that when the IRS issues a summons to either harrass or pressure a taxpayer, or
issues the summons in bad faith, the summons is improper. Id. In an enforcement proceeding,
the IRS has the initial burden of proving that it has met all four Powell requirements. United
States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). Thus, the
IRS has made a prima facie case for good faith enforcement of the proceeding once it has met
all four Powell requirements. Id. The burden then shifts to the taxpayer to rebut the prima
facie case by proving that the IRS has not met all four requirements. Id. at 540. In an
enforcement proceeding, the taxpayer carries a heavy burden that requires the taxpayer to rebut
the IRS' case by alleging specific facts that infer that some wrongful conduct exists on the part
of the IRS. Id. at 39. The taxpayer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the IRS
did not follow all four Powell requirements or that the IRS abandoned any civil investigation.
Id. at 543-44.
78. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
79. See id. at 532; Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58; see supra note 73 and accompanying text
(legitimate purpose requirement of Powell).
80. 400 U.S. at 532. In Donaldson v. United States, an IRS special agent served a
summons on defendant taxpayer Donaldson's former employer and the employer's accountant
to obtain records of Donaldson's employment. Id. at 519-19. The IRS filed petitions for
enforcement of the summons. Id. at 520. Donaldson filed a motion to intervene in the
enforcement proceeding, alleging that the IRS was investigating him solely to obtain evidence
concerning criminal tax violations. Id. at 521. Donaldson claimed that the IRS issued the
summons for an improper purpose and not for the good faith purpose of ascertaining correct
tax liability. Id. at 532. See supra note 73 (Powell stated that the IRS may not issue summons
for improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal prosecution).
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that the summons was outside the scope of the authorized purposes of IRC
section 7602(a).8 ' The Supreme Court held that a summons is valid when the
IRS issues the summons for the purpose of carrying out a section 7602(a)
authorized investigation.12 The Supreme Court recognized that the IRS might
issue a summons to assist a revenue agent in investigating possible civil
liability as well as to aid a special agent in determining whether to recommend
the case to the Department of Justice for prosecution. 3 The Supreme Court
enforced the summons in Donaldson because the summons had a dual civil-
criminal purpose.8 4 The Donaldson court stated, however, that under the
legitimate purpose standard enunciated in Powell, 5 a court will not enforce
a summons when the IRS has issued the summons solely for a criminal
investigation, or when the IRS has referred a case to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution.
8 6
The Donaldson holding created conflict between the lower circuits con-
cerning the meaning of the legitimate purpose standard. 7 In United States
v. LaSalle National Bank,"s the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
Donaldson legitimate purpose standard. 9 In LaSalle, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision to deny enforcement of two summonses
that the lower court had determined the IRS had issued in bad faith since
81. 400 U.S. at 532. In Donaldson, the defendant taxpayer argued that the dictum in
Reisman precluded the IRS from issuing a summons for investigation of a civil violation that
might result in criminal prosecution. Id.; see Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449. The Reisman Court
had stated that a summoned person may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground,
including the ground that the information in the summons is sought for an improper purpose
such as obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449 (citing
Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1956)). The Donaldson Court held that the
Reisman dictum applied only to an investigation conducted pursuant to a pending criminal
charge, or to an investigation for solely criminal purposes. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 533; see
Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449.
82. 400 U.S. at 535; see supra note 2 (text of § 7602(a)).
83. 400 U.S. at 534-35. The Donaldson Court stated that merely because a special agent
is investigating possible tax fraud in conjunction with a revenue agent's civil investigation does
not mean that prosecution will ensue. Id.
84. Id. at 534.
85, See supra note 73 (discussion of legitimate purpose standard).
86. 400 U.S. at 533-36. The Donaldson opinion did not clarify the point in time at which
the IRS may be deemed to have issued a summons for an improper purpose. Id. First, the
Donaldson Court held that the IRS may issue a § 7602 summons in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution. Id. The Court also ruled that the IRS might have
issued a summons for an improper purpose if the IRS had issued the summons for a solely
criminal purpose, or if the IRS had recommended the case for criminal prosecution. Id. The
Donaldson opinion also stated that the IRS may issue a summons to conduct a joint civil-
criminal investigation up to the point in time at which the investigation is sufficiently far enough
along to support a recommendation to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Id.
87. Id. at 533-36; see supra note 86 (Donaldson opinion did not clarify exactly when
summons that IRS issued for criminal evidence might be issued for improper purpose).
88. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
89. Id. at 313-316; see infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussion of LaSalle
decision).
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the special agent was conducting the investigation for solely criminal pur-
poses.90 The LaSalle Court ruled that although a special agent may be
pursuing an investigation for solely criminal purposes, courts must examine
the institutional posture of the IRS to determine whether the investigation
has solely criminal purposes. 9' The LaSalle Court formulated a test which
requires that the IRS meet two conditions before a court will enforce a
summons.92 The first condition of LaSalle requires the IRS to issue the
summons before the IRS recommends the case to the Department of Justice
for criminal prosecution.93 Under the second condition of the LaSalle test,
the IRS must use the summons power in good faith for the purposes
authorized under IRC section 7602(a), 94 which, the Court stated, include
issuing the summons before making an institutional commitment to recom-
mend the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 9 The
LaSalle Court concluded that the good faith condition also requires the IRS
to meet the four requirements enunciated in Powell.96
The dissent in LaSalle97 opposed the majority's "institutional purpose"
test 98 on the grounds that the Donaldson interpretation of IRC section 7602
did not view the issuance of a summons solely for a criminal purpose as
improper. 99 The LaSalle dissent further disagreed with the institutional
90. 437 U.S. at 299, 321. In United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, an IRS special agent
received information from a confidential informant that a certain taxpayer was not disclosing
rental income in violation of the IRC. Id. The special agent investigated the case on his own,
without any assistance from a revenue agent. Id. While investigating the taxpayer, the special
agent issued two summons to respondent LaSalle National Bank which held land trusts for the
taxpayer. Id. at 300-01. LaSalle argued that the special agent's investigation was purely criminal
and that the IRS had issued the summons in bad faith. Id. at 303.
91. Id. at 316. The question presented in LaSalle was whether the special agent's criminal
purpose precluded the enforcement of the summons under the improper purpose or bad faith
rule. Id. at 307. The LaSalle Court stated that the IRS must exercise the summons authority in
good faith and in accordance with the congressionally authorized purpose of § 7602. Id. The
Supreme Court held that regardless of the special agent's intention to conduct a solely criminal
investigation, the Court entered the summons nonetheless because the IRS as an institution had
not abandoned the civil investigation. Id.
92. Id. at 318; see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing LaSalle test for
determining whether to enforce IRS summons).
93. 437 U.S. at 318.
94. Id.; see supra note 2 (purposes authorized by § 7602).
95. 427 U.S. at 318. The LaSalle Court stated that to prove improper purpose or bad
faith under the second condition of the LaSalle test for judicial enforcement of a summons the
taxpayer must show that the IRS does not have a valid civil determination or collection purpose.
Id. at 317. The Court recognized that because civil and criminal tax liabilities are often
coterminous, the taxpayer has a heavy burden in proving that the IRS as an institution has
abandoned a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose. Id.
96. Id. at 318; see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing Powell minimum
requirements of good faith test).
97. 437 U.S. at 319 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying test (discussing LaSalle institutional purpose
test).
99. 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The LaSalle dissent stated that § 7602 and
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purpose test because the dissent felt that the test would prove unworkable
and provoke unnecessary litigation.' °0 The dissent preferred the objective
bright-line test of Donaldson.10 1 Therefore, the dissent argued that a court
should enforce a summons when the IRS has issued the summons in good
faith and prior to recommending the case for criminal prosecution. 02 2
In holding that a summons is not available once the IRS institutionally
has abandoned the civil tax liability investigation, and is pursuing exclusively
a criminal investigation, 0 3 the LaSalle decision resulted in excessive litigation
concerning whether the IRS was using summonses for an improper criminal
purpose.'04 In response to the LaSalle problem, Congress enacted section
333(a) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982.105
TEFRA amended IRC section 7602 by expanding the statutorily authorized
purposes for which the IRS may issue a summons to include .the purpose of
investigating any offense of the internal revenue laws. °0 In enacting TEFRA,
Congress jodified the bright line test enunciated in the LaSalle dissent. '! 7
the Donaldson opinion both required only that the IRS issue the summons in good faith and
prior to recomnending the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Id.
100. Id. The LaSalle dissent stated that the "institutional purpose" test, which states that
the IRS issued the summons in good faith if the IRS as an institution has not abandoned the
civil investigation, was too elusive. Id. The dissent feared that the test would produce endless
discovery proceedings concerning the subjective position of the IRS. Id.
101. Id. The LaSalle dissent realized that the LaSalle majority had clarified the Donaldson
opinion. Id.; see supra note 86 (Donaldson opinion confusing to lower circuits). The majority
in LaSalle noted that Donaldson ruled that a court may enforce a summons issued under §
7602 if the IRS issued the summons in good faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized
purposes and prior to any recommendation for prosecution to the Department of Justice. 437
U.S. at 318; see Donaldson, 400 U.S. 517 at 536. The LaSalle dissent stated that although the
majority had clarified the Donaldson holding, the majority had not relied solely on Donaldson
but instead had added the institutional purpose test. 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J. dissenting);
see Donaldson, 400 U.S. 517 at 536. The LaSalle dissent noted that the institutional purpose
test did not have any IRC authority or case precedence. 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The LaSalle dissent assumed that the institutional purpose test would require the courts to
examine subjectively the posture of the IRS whereas the requirements under Donaldson would
require only an objective examination. Id.; see Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 532-33 (summons proper
if issued prior to recommendation for prosecution).
102. 437 U.S. at 320.
103. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing LaSalle "institutional purpose"
test).
104. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess 285 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONa.
& AD. NEws 1030, 1031 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 494]. The Senate Finance
Committee noted in the Committee Report on TEFRA that the LaSalle institutional purpose
test resulted in wasteful litigation without any significant benefit to the taxpayers because
taxpayers find it virtually impossible to prevent enforcement of a summons on the basis of the
institutional purpose test. Id.; see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (legislative history
of § 333(a) of TEFRA).
105. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title
III, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 622 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 7602(b) and 7602(c)).
106. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985) (codifying § 333(a) of TEFRA).
107. The Tax Compliance Act of 1982, and Related Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 6300
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1982) (statement of Hon.
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Under TEFRA, the IRS now may issue a summons to gather evidence of a
criminal violation of the internal revenue laws as long as the IRS has not
referred the case to the Department of Justice for prosecution. 0 8 Although
the enactment of section 333(a) of TEFRA has clarified when a valid
summons exists in a case with a criminal aspect,' 9 the IRS now may issue
an administrative summons solely for the purpose of gathering evidence of
a criminal violation."1
0
While TEFRA expanded the purposes for which the IRS may issue a
summons to include solely criminal investigations, TEFRA does not require
the IRS to make a greater showing to the court for enforcement of a criminal
summons than for enforcement of a civil summons."' Rather, the IRS must
show only that the IRS issued a summons according to the requirements of
Glenn Archer, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice
[hereinafter cited as Hearing on H.R. 6300]. Mr. Archer stated that taxpayers had used the
LaSalle case primarily for delaying enforcement proceedings. Id. at 89. Mr. Archer found that
many taxpayers challenge a summons under the institutional purpose test, although taxpayers
usually do not succeed on this challenge. Id. Therefore, Mr. Archer supported an amendment
to IRC § 7602 authorizing the IRS to issue a summons at any time prior to referring the case
to the Department of Justice. Id. Mr. Archer noted that this limitation on the summons
authority of the IRS would prohibit the institutional purpose tests that the LaSalle case
fgrmulated. Id.
108. See S. RP. No. 494, supra note 104, at 1031. See I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp.
1985); I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985). The Senate Report accompanying TEFRA stated
that to provide a clear definition of a properly issued summons in an investigation with a
criminal aspect the purposes for which the IRS may issue a summons had to be expanded. S.
REP. No. 494, supra note 104, at 1031. The Senate Report explained that the IRS may issue a
summons, or commence an action to enforce a summons, as long as the IRS had not referred
the case to the Department of Justice. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); I.R.C. §
7602(c) (West Supp. 1985).
109. See I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985); see
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D Sass., COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF
H.R. 6300 (Tm TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1982) AND H.R. 5829 (THE TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982) (Comm. print 1982) (TEFRA § 333(a) provides bright line test for
determining whether IRS may issue summons); see note 108 (TEFRA amendment provides clear
definition of properly issued summons).
110. See, e.g, Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1984) (investigation of
criminal violatinos of IRC is valid purpose for issuance of section 7602(b) summons); Moutevelis
v. United States, 727 F.2d 313, 314 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); McTaggart v. United States, 570 F.
Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (same); Joint Committee on Taxation, ANNUAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL REsPONSIIUTY ACT, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 234-36 (1982). The Joint Committee on taxation stated that under pre-TEFRA law,
the IRS could issue an administrative summons only to make a determination of civil tax
liability and to aid in the collection of taxes. Joint Committee on Taxation, ANNuAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISION OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RaSPONSmILITY ACT, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 234-36 (1982). The Committee explained that TEFRA expanded the purposes
for which the IRS may issue a summons to include criminal offenses, even when the criminal
investigation is the sole investigation. Id.
111. S. REP. No. 494, supra note 104, at 1032. The Senate Report stated that TEFRA does
not change any of the other requirements under present law that the IRS must make under
Powell. Id.; see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (IRS must meet Powell requirements
for enforcement of summons).
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Powell."2 Specifically, a court can enforce a challenged summons when the
IRS conducts the investigation pursuant to a legitimate purpose, the inquiry
is relevant to that purpose, the information sought is not already in the
possession of the IRS, and the IRS has followed the administrative steps
that the IRC required."' Thus, IRC section 7602(b), as amended, authorizes
the IRS to issue a summons pursuant to the investigation of a criminal
offense without a showing probable cause."
4
By expanding the purposes for which the IRS may issue a summons to
include the investigation of a criminal tax violation until the IRS has made
a referral to the Department of Justice, Congress provided for an easy
judicial determination of when an IRS summons is enforceable." 5 The
Supreme Court decisions of Reisman, Powell, Donaldson and LaSalle,
however, imply that a summons issued to investigate a solely criminal charge
would involve a more serious invasion of privacy than a summons issued to
investigate a civil charge." 6 Although all four Supreme Court decisions
provided various standards for a district court's review of a summons issued
in pursuit of a civil or joint civil-criminal investigation, the standards of
review do not protect the fourth amendment rights of a taxpayer suspected
112. See S. REP. No. 494, supra note 104 at 1022; Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. Powell
requires that the IRS conduct the IRS investigation pursuant to a legitimate, administrative
purpose, show that the inquiry might be relevant to that legitimate purpose, show that the IRS
does not already possess the information, and follow the administrative steps outlined in the
IRS. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
113. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing Powell requirements for
enforcement of summons).
114. I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 2 (§ 7602(b) authorizes the IRS
to investigate any violation of IRC); S. REP. No. 494, supra note 104, at 1032 (TEFRA does
not alter four Powell requirements that IRS must meet to gain enforcement of challenged
summons); Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; supra note 70 and accompanying text (IRS does not need
to meet standard of probable cause).
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (Congress codified bright line test to reduce
litigation).
116. See Reisman, 375 U.S. at 445-46. The Reisman decision held for the first time that
an enforcement action under § 7602 is an adversarial proceeding that involves a court making
a determination of the challenges between the adversarial parties. Id. The Reisman Court
realized that the IRS should allow judicial review of the civil action to the parties summoned.
Id. In holding that a challenge to a civil action demanded a judicial determination, the Reisman
Court implied that a solely criminal action would necessitate a more stringent standard of
judicial determination than would the civil action. See id. The Powell Court stated that the
court does not require probable cause in all agency investigations because importing a probable
cause standard would "jeopardize" the investigative power of the agency. Powell, 379 U.S. at
56. The Powell Court stated, however, that the same limitations that restrain a court in issuing
pretrial orders also restrains an agency's investigative function. Id. In so stating, the Powell
Court implied that an investigative agency like the IRS does not have inherent powers to search
and seize evidence of a criminal violation without the limitations that the fourth amendment
imposes upon the Government. Id. at 57. The Donaldson Court stated that when the sole object
of a summons is to gather information for criminal prosecution, the purpose of the summons
is not legitimate and a court should deny enforcement of the summons. Donaldson, 400 U.S.
at 533. The LaSalle Court emphasized that the IRS could use a summons in a criminal
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of criminal fraud either before"7 or after judicial review of an IRS sum-
mons. "
In the enforcement proceeding of a summons issued for a criminal
investigation, if the taxpayer challenges the summons, the IRS must show
that the IRS met the Powell requirements to make a prima facie case for
enforcement. ' 19 The IRS does not have to make a showing of probable cause
before the enforcing court that the IRS believes the taxpayer has committed
a specific violation. 20 Rather, once the IRS has established that a summons
satisfies the Powell requirements, the burden of proving that the IRS issued
the summons for an improper purpose shifts to the taxpayer.' 2' Since after
TEFRA the IRS may summon a taxpayer for solely criminal investigative
purposes prior to referring the case to the Department of Justice, the taxpayer
has a heavy burden in proving that the IRS issued the summons for an
improper purpose. I2 The Powell Court stated that the IRS has issued a
summons for an improper purpose if the IRS intended either to harass the
taxpayer, to pressure the taxpayer into settling the dispute, or to investigate
the taxpayer for nontax purposes.'
23
Similarly, the LaSalle Court maintained that the IRS has issued a
summons for an improper purpose when the IRS has acted solely as an
information gathering agency for the Department of Justice. 24 The potential
investigation when the IRS was investigating civil conduct. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 308-09. The
LaSalle Court noted that this dual civil-criminal purpose was inherent in the nation's tax system.
Id. at 312. The LaSalle Court, therefore, concluded that only when the criminal and civil
aspects of the tax fraud case begin to diverge should a court place a limitation on the IRS'
authority to issue a summons. Id. at 311. Thus, the LaSalle Court stated that a court would
not enforce a summons issued solely for a criminal investigation prior to recommendation to
the Department of Justice. Id. at 314.
117. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (summonses that are not challenged do
not protect fourth amendment rights of taxpayer).
118. See infra notes 119-39 and accompanying text (summons enforcement proceeding does
not protect fourth amendment rights of taxpayer).
119. See e.g., United States v. Reis, 765 F.2d 1094, 1096 (11th Cir, 1985) (IRS summons
is enforceable if IRS makes prima facie showing before court that IRS has met Powell
requirements); United States v. Centennial Builders, Inc., 747 F.2d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 1984)
(same); Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); United States v.
Beacon Federal Savings and Loan, 718 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (same).
120. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; supra note 70 and accompanying text (courts do not require
IRS to meet standard of probable cause).
121. See, e.g., Kroll v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 982, 985-986 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (taxpayer
must disprove existence of legitimate purpose or show enforcement of summons is improper or
abuse of court's process to meet burden; Godwin v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 1209, 1213
(D. Del. 1983) (same); Universal Life Church v. United States, 52 AFTR2d 83-6318, 83-6320,
(P-H) 83-5366 (W.D. VA. 1983) (sAm).
122. Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (taxpayer has heavy
burden to prove that enforcement of IRS summons would abuse court's process unless IRS has
recommended case to Department of Justice) (citing United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank,
607 F.2d 61, 71 (3rd Cir. 1979)).
123. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58.
124. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317. The LaSalle Court stated that the IRS may not use the
summons power to summon information for use by an agency other than the IRS. Id.
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exists, therefore, for the IRS to delay reference to the Department of Justice
under section 7602(c) of the IRC while the IRS summons evidence for a
criminal prosecution. 25 In this situation, the taxpayer would be unable to
prove that the IRS was acting solely as an information gathering agency for
the Department of Justice because most IRS criminal investigations are
interwoven with IRS civil investigations.
26
The limitations on an IRS summons issued for a solely criminal investi-
gation do not protect a taxpayer suspected of a criminal violation in the
same way that the fourth amendment limitations protect a person suspected
of a crime. 27 The IRS, however, may not issue a summons for an investi-
gation of a riminal case after the IRS has referred the case to the Department
of Justice. 28 Although the IRS must issue a summons if the taxpayer is
unwilling to comply with a request, the fourth amendment only limits the
summons by requiring that the IRS summons be reasonable in scope. 29 If
the summoned taxpayer challenges the summons, section 7604 of the IRC
entitles the taxpayer to federal district court review. 30 Although the district
court examines the challenge before enforcing the summons, the court will
enforce the summons only if the IRS meets the four Powell requirements. 3'
On the other hand, the fourth amendment limits the police investigation
of a person suspected of a crime by requiring that the search and seizure of
125. See Universal Life Church v. United States, 52 AFTR2d 83-6318, 83-6320, (P-H) 83-
5366 (W.D. VA. 1983). IN Universal Life Church v. United States, the defendants argued that
under the bright line test of IRC § 7602(c), the IRS could delay referral of the case to the
Department of Justice while the IRS gathered evidence through the IRS summons power. Id.
The Universal Life Church court stated that since defendant's exhibits demonstrated that the
IRS had made an institutional commitment to refer the case to the Department of Justice but
did not show that the IRS actually had referred the case to the Department of Justice, the IRS
summons was valid. Id. at 83-6321.
126. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314 (1978). In United States
v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, the Supreme Court noted that a tax fraud investigation rarely is solely
criminal in nature because an inquiry into the criminal nature of the case is inseparable from
an inquiry into the civil nature of the case. Id.
127. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (limitations on IRS summons issued
for solely criminal investigation); infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing fourth
amendment limitations on police officer's investigation of person suspected of crime).
128. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985) (IRS may not issue summons if IRS has referred
case to Department of Justice).
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973) (fourth amendment
limits IRS to reasonable searches and seizures and prohibits unrestricted rummaging of person's
private possessions); supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussion of fourth amendment
limitation of IRS summons).
130. I.R.C. § 7604 (West Supp. 1985) (federal district courts have jurisdiction to enforce
IRS summons).
131. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. A court will enforce an IRS summons if the IRS
conducts the investigation pursuant to a legitimate administrative purpose, the IRS shows that
the inquiry is relevant to that legitimate purpose, the IRS does not possess the information
sought, and the IRS follows the administrative procedures set forth in the IRC. Id.; see supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Powell requirements).
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that person's possessions be reasonable. 3 2 The fourth amendment also
requires that the police obtain a search warrant prior to the search.' 33 Unlike
the limitations on an IRS summons, however, the fourth amendment also
requires that the police base a search warrant on probable cause 34 and that
a neutral magistrate issue the warrant. 35 Probable cause implies that a
specific person has committed a specific violation with respect to specifically
identified property or persons.' 36 If the police do not establish probable cause
to search and seize, the neutral magistrate will not issue a search warrant.
37
Therefore, the district court's standard of review in Morgan for enforcing
an IRS summons in a solely criminal investigation does not provide the
protection that the fourth amendment warrant requirement affords in a
police investigation of a person suspected of a crime.'38
In holding that an IRS summons issued pursuant to a criminal investi-
gation does not violate the fourth amendment, the Fourth Circuit in Morgan
implied that redress to the judicial process will cure any defects in the IRS
summons procedure. 39 Nonetheless, the IRS enforces many summonses
without the intervention of the judicial process.14' While voluntary consent
to a search constitutes a valid waiver of fourth amendment protection, a
taxpayer may consent to an IRS search merely because the IRS summons
may appear self-enforcing on its face, or because the taxpayer may not know
that he can challenge the summons.' 4' Thus, resort to the courts for protection
of a taxpayer's constitutional rights may never become an alternative for the
taxpayer who does not challenge an IRS summons.
42
132. See U.S. CONs'r. amend. IV (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures).
133. See id. (fourth amendment requires that police obtain iearch warrant prior to search
and seizure); supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussion of fourth amendment warrant
requirement).
134. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV (fourth amendment requires that government base search
warrant on probable cause); supra note 5 (discussion of fourth amendment probable cause
requirement).
135. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (fourth amendment requires that neutral magistrate issue
search warrant); supra note 6 (discussion of fourth amendment neutral magistrate requirement).
136. See supra note 5 (discussion of determination of probable cause).
137. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (neutral magistrate determines
whether evidence that police officers presented justifies probable cause for issuance of search
warrant).
138. See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text (fourth amendment warrant requirement
provides greater determination of reason for searching and seizing a person's possessions than
IRS summons).
139. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1012; see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (Morgan
court's discussion of means by which judicial process will prevent abuse of summons).
140. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (district court does not review unchal-
lenged summons).
141. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 230 (1973) (voluntary consent to search
and seizure of evidence in course of search may constitute waiver of person's constitutional
rights under fourth amendment).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 141 (unchallenged summons may violate taxpayer's
fourth amendment rights).
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In enforcing an IRS criminal summons, the Fourth Circuit in Morgan
applied a standard of review which the Supreme Court developed for
enforcing an IRS summons issued in pursuit of a civil investigation. 143 The
Fourth Circuit noted that TEFRA authorized the IRS to issue a summons
for a criminal investigation. 1" When Congress enacted TEFRA, Congress
meant only to clarify prior Supreme Court decisions by creating a bright line
test for determining when the IRS could not issue a summons.' 45 IRC section
7602(b) is noteworthy since the LaSalle determination of when the IRS could
issue a summons proved unworkable. 1'" TEFRA establishes an easy test for
determining whether a summons issued for the purpose of pursuing a criminal
investigation is enforceable by declaring that the IRS may issue a summons
in pursuit of a criminal investigation only until the IRS refers the case to
the Department of Justice. 4 7 Section 7602(b), however, gives the IRS the
authority to examine the personal documents and records of a taxpayer
suspected of criminal tax fraud without requiring the IRS to obtain a warrant
based upon probable cause and issued by a neutral magistrate. 4s Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Morgan jeopardizes the privacy interests of
a taxpayer that the fourth amendment warrant requirement protects. 149
VIRGINIA CARRUTHERS
143. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1011-12; see supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit's determination that IRS summons issued for criminal purposes was valid); supra notes
62-97 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's development of standard of review
for enforcement proceeding of IRS civil summons).
144. Morgan, 761 F.2d at 1011; see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit's discussion of TEFRA); supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of § 333(a) of TEFRA).
145. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussion of reasons that Congress
enacted § 333(a) of TEFRA).
146. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (Congress enacted TEFRA because LaSalle
holding did not clarify point in time at which IRS could issue summons property).
147. See I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1985) (IRS may not issue summons if IRS has
referred case to Department of Justice for criminal prosecution); supra note 108 and accom-
panying text (same).
148. I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 2 (text of IRS § 7602(b)); supra
notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing requirements IRS must establish for enforcement
of criminal summons).
149. 761 F.2d at 1011-12; see supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussing fourth
amendment search warrant requirements); supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text (fourth
amendment warrant requirement requires stricter determination of reason for invading person's
privacy than standard of review for IRS summons).
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